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Abstract 
This paper questions a key assumption in the organizations literature that the dynamism of 
institutional logics and practice variations is the result of rivalry among logics and actors, of 
tensions and institutional shifts, and of the agency of institutional entrepreneurs. This study 
examines in rich historical detail the development of accounting in the Jesuit Order, 
illustrating how Jesuit accounting started from a rationality that did not presuppose an 
external ordering principle; instead, Jesuit rationality was unfolding—founded in continuous 
interrogations informed by common, purposeful procedural logics stemming from rhetorical 
practices used to classify, recall, and invent knowledge. I examine this concept of unfolding 
rationality in two areas of Jesuit practices: spiritual self-accountability and administrative 
accounting and recordkeeping. In this Jesuit rationality, the relationships between means and 
ends, and how and why behaviors take place, were not anchored permanently in a substantive 
logic. Instead, procedural logics left individual Jesuits and the community to imagine modes 
of action in the specific social and organizational contexts in which their missions operated. 
Jesuit rationality was thus unfolding, a persistent and recursive mode of governing social 
behavior and searching for organizational order that generated large-scale administrative 
routines and institutional dynamism while never fully achieving that order. The analysis 
brings into question our understanding of the historical and institutional genealogies of 
modern rationality and its taken-for-granted link with Protestant ethics. 
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 3 
The current fascination with institutional logics underplays the historical dynamism 
and complexity of social orders, which may restrict the very analytic opportunities presented 
by attending to logics and other social orderings. Friedland and Alford (1991: 241) aimed to 
“bring society back” into the analysis of social order in a way that did not give any form of 
institutional order causal primacy a priori. For them, society comprises an “interlinked set of 
institutional logics”; dominant Western notions of the individual, agency, freedom, and the 
related concept of instrumental rationality are all products of modernity, institutionally and 
historically shaped by the emergence of the institutional logics of the market, democracy, the 
family, the state, and religion (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 239–240). In their view, 
institutions are symbolic systems constantly enacted in rituals to avoid the risk of a given 
order’s gaining primacy. Social order and institutional dynamism emerged from these 
enactments, as well as from exploiting the inherent contradictions within and among logics 
(Hallett and Ventresca, 2006; Friedland, 2009). 
Logics now tend to be viewed instead as a stable set of beliefs and assumptions, with 
differences across logics as the source of practice variation (e.g., Lounsbury, 2008). Broader 
institutional dynamism (e.g., Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Townley, 2002) emerges only 
from rivalry among competing logics and institutional actors (e.g., Reay and Hinings, 2009), 
from tensions and institutional shifts (e.g., Thorton and Ocasio, 1998; Seo and Creed, 2002), 
or from the agency of institutional entrepreneurs (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Garud, Hardy, and 
Maguire, 2007). In short, the dynamism of logics is no longer thought to reside in the logics 
themselves. 
The late-medieval and early-modern periods, however, offer evidence of substantially 
different sources, ideas, and practices to reevaluate some substantive “givens” in how logics 
inform the rationality of social behavior (Oakes, Townley, and Cooper, 1998) and how 
organizational order emerges, consolidates, and changes (Weber, 1978; Friedland and Alford, 
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1991; Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003). Taking advantage of this opportunity, this paper 
develops an archival and documental analysis of the late-sixteenth-century to early-
seventeenth-century Jesuit Order, focusing on early Jesuit accounting and ordering practices, 
a case outside the familiar ambit of sources for organization theory. The Jesuit Order, known 
in English also as the Society of Jesus, is a Roman Catholic Order founded in Rome in 1540 
by Ignatius of Loyola; in this paper I sometimes refer to it simply as “the Order.” I seek to 
show that Jesuits’ actions were not guided by choices among a repertoire of readily available 
stable core logics, each supporting different courses of action. The “Jesuit way” of governing 
the Order consisted of a set of “guidelines on how to interpret and function in social 
institutions” (Greenwood et al., 2011: 318), which were procedural rather than substantive (a 
meta-narrative; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005: 59). This rich historical case of Jesuit 
practices and order brings a fresh empirical view to questions about the source dynamism of 
logics. 
The alternative genealogy of the notion of rationality that this paper proposes offers 
insights that encourage revisiting the accepted link between the emergence of modern 
rationality and Protestant ethics (Weber, 1956). The translation of late-medieval and early-
modern humanist rhetorical practices (Carruthers, 1990, 1998; Bolzoni, 1995) into the realm 
of administration explains similarities between the institutional vocabularies used in 
administration and in Jesuit practices of spiritual self-accountability and provides a different 
context for the emergence of accounting and recordkeeping as rational tools for managerial 
coordination (cf. Chandler, 1977; Yates, 1989). This study illustrates how the development of 
modern accounting and its power of rationalization (Weber, 1956; Carruthers and Espeland, 
1991) took place in a cultural context in which visual rhetorical representations were not 
aimed at providing factual objectivity but were instead incomplete ways to classify, order, 
and invent arguments for endless theological debates. 
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Logics, Rationality, and Accounting 
Logics and Rationality 
To address the problem of what constitutes rational action and social order, Friedland 
and Alford (1991: 253) proposed that “institutions are constituted by symbols and material 
practices, and . . . society is composed of multiple institutional logics available to individuals 
and organizations as [a] basis for action.” In this way, they argued, broad sectorial activity 
systems work by central logics and that social action takes shape in the conflict and tension 
among, and within, these linked networks. These logics have been increasingly used to 
illustrate the historical contingency of institutions and the dynamics of organizational fields 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). For instance, Fligstein (1990) explained changes in the 
management ethos of the capitalist corporation by showing how finance has supplanted 
operations and marketing as the prevailing ordering regime in this organizational form. 
Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch (2003) showed how commercial logics in the waste 
management industry redefined meanings and practices in U.S. nonprofit recycling. Thornton 
(2004) illustrated the shift from an editorial to a market logic in the publishing industry, and 
Suddaby, Cooper, and Greenwood (2007) illustrated changes in the logic shaping behaviors 
in large accounting firms by moving from a professional to a commercial attitude in dealing 
with the provision of accounting services. 
But as Friedland and Alford (1991: 249–250) remarked, logics do not really exist 
outside the relationships between symbols and practices. Macro forces, such as rationality 
and institutional logics, and the commensurate numerical and scientific representations, such 
as accounting and economic calculations, are never a priori, complete, and objective. They 
are always subject to continuous power struggles and translations (Czarniawska and Sevón, 
2005) that result from the epistemological impossibility of fully grounding their existence, 
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beliefs, and assumptions in complete scientific representations and objective calculations 
(Knorr Cetina, 1997). 
Current views of institutional logics also struggle with this incompleteness (see 
Cloutier and Langley, 2013). Recent work has attempted to address this by showing how 
mechanisms of social order emerge from dynamic tensions among distinct logics (see Dunn 
and Jones, 2010) and between agents and social structure (DiMaggio, 1988; Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997; Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009). Scholars have recently paid attention 
to the interactions of human agency, boundary work, and organizational practices in relation 
to what counts as legitimate within a field (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010) and to how certain 
trading practices are performed makes them acceptable or not (Anteby, 2010); this reminds us 
that something is still underspecified in understanding how structuration processes (Giddens, 
1984; Barley and Tolbert, 1997) lead to the establishment of new logics, social order, and 
rational behavior. 
These attempts seek to build on Friedland and Alford’s (1991) initial inspiration, 
which, following Weber, argued that society was not an integrated cultural formation but 
rather a set of interlinked institutional spheres. They underscore the need for a theoretical and 
methodological next step to reengineer the notion of logic to adequately account for 
institutional complexities and their continuous process of translation (Czarniawska and 
Sevón, 2005), and they point to a critical place for my argument about unfolding rationalities. 
 
Rationality and Accounting 
As Carruthers and Espeland (1991: 32) noted, Weber, Sombart, and Schumpeter made 
“some dramatic claims . . . about the relationship between accounting . . . and the 
development of rationality.” The new institutional sociology literature has also viewed 
accounting as related to the expansion of cultural rationalizations (Meyer, 1986; Meyer, Boli, 
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and Thomas, 1987; Carruthers, 1995; Oakes, Townley, and Cooper, 1998) typical of Western 
culture (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Due to the ambiguity of the link between knowledge and 
action, accounting arises as an instrument to legitimize organizational and social actions by 
virtue of the apparent rationality of its calculations (March, 1987; Carruthers, 1995): 
“accounting arises to count, not the visible, but the invisible” (Meyer, 1986: 351). From this 
perspective, accounts are used to communicate “a picture of the world” (Carruthers and 
Espeland, 1991: 320) that seems uncontestable because accounting, by giving visibility to 
management objects and organizational activities, creates a “facticity that appears objective, 
beyond the fray of politics or mere opinion” (Miller and Power, 2013: 559). 
Through its mediating technologies, such as business plans, budgets, and capital 
budgeting (Miller and Power, 2013), accounting operationalizes broader societal discourses 
about efficiency and rationality and market logics at the organizational level. Hospitals can 
then be redesigned as cost centers (Kurunmäki, 1999), and accounting firms and universities 
shift from being informed by professional and educational logics to market logics (Covaleski 
et al., 1998). Micro-organizational routines of accounting make macro forces of social order 
and rationality real (Pentland, 1993). 
The result is that accounting and current views of institutional logics and rational 
action seem unremarkable; they have become taken-for-granted institutions. Accounting 
provides a rational and legitimating narrative of “how resources are used, activities 
controlled, and purposes achieved” (Meyer, 1983: 265). It makes researchers forget that 
accounting “has the tendency to become what it was not” (Hopwood, 1987: 207), so they 
view the relationships among calculations, rationalization, and logics of order as 
unproblematic. This short review of works in sociology and in accounting makes explicit how 
accounting legitimizes power and how the logics informing rationality are externally 
specified and self-evident. Rational action and calculation involve behavior that aligns with 
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the specific substance, i.e., the beliefs and assumptions (Scott, 2008: 187), of given logics. 
This shift in the research literature entails a loss in the richness of Weberian view of various 
rationalities, each with its own purposes, processes, and mechanisms (Townley, 2002). In this 
institutionalist view of rationality, the Weberian means–ends connection was a given, and 
known technologies were used to produce known outcomes. 
I draw on a body of medieval and early-modern scholarship on rhetoric, combined 
with evidence from seventeenth-century accounting textbooks and methods, to provide an 
alternative lens to look at the relationship between rationality and techniques of 
representation such as accounting. This method allows me to operationalize the study of 
rationality without treating it as externally specified and self-evident. I then use an archival 
and empirical analysis of two central Jesuit practices—spiritual self-accountability and 
administrative accounting and recordkeeping—to show how these produced an open-ended 
and recursive organizational order that was sustained by a quasi-religious belief in moral and 
administrative improvement. 
 
Method 
Research Design 
Several institutional scholars have shown the importance of historical analysis for 
understanding the emergence, consolidation, and change of logics (e.g., Padgett and Ansell, 
1993; Dobbin, 1994; Guillén, 1994; Carruthers, 1996; McKenna, 2006). Here, I make use of 
copious, detailed archival and documentary sources from the sixteenth-century origins of the 
Jesuit Order—its organization, doctrines, and accounting processes regarding both the 
administrative and spiritual practices of individual members—and consider how these 
resonate with early-modern accounting tools and work through the seventeenth century. This 
is the evidentiary basis for my arguments on Jesuit unfolding rationality and for an 
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interpretation of the procedural nature of logics as guidelines for individual and social action. 
Prior works (Quattrone, 2004, 2009) have reconstructed the detailed accounting techniques of 
the Jesuit Order to show the multifaceted nature of accounting and its ability to engage users 
because of its rhetorical nature and links with the art of memory. I build on those baseline 
studies here with additional data and arguments from organization theory to understand issues 
of rationality and logics of order. 
Given the scale of the Jesuits’ geographical expansion and the volume of original 
archives and documentation of the Order, I made some preliminary choices to narrow down 
the space and time of the analysis of archival and documentary sources (see also Chitnis, 
2006). In terms of geography, I focused on the relationships between Rome and the Sicilian 
Province and its colleges.1 This pragmatic choice was guided by the absolute importance of 
this Province for its number of colleges—34 by 1694, with the first Jesuit college opening in 
Messina in 1548 (Bangert, 1986)—and its economic relevance: the income of the Sicilian 
Province alone in the seventeenth century was greater than the tax income collected by the 
Kingdom of Sicily (Renda, 1993). Finally, Lodovico Flori, S. J. was the author of an 
accounting treatise (1636) written explicitly for the administration of the Jesuit colleges and 
was also Procurator of the Sicilian Province (in charge of its economic affairs) at least from 
1617 per the Archivio di Stato di Palermo (Archive of the State of Palermo, or ASP). In terms 
of the time period, I paid greatest attention to the span 1580–1660 to observe the 
institutionalization of bookkeeping and recordkeeping practices that later became standard. 
I made another choice that concerns how to frame data collection and interpretation. 
Students of the role of visualizations in medieval and early-modern rhetoric (Carruthers, 
1990, 1998; Bolzoni, 1995) have argued that these are in fact instruments of knowledge 
                                                       
1 The Province was an administration rather than simply a geographical unit, with the Sicilian Province, 
for instance, including the island of Malta. 
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classification and invention rather than simply forms of communication and persuasion, as a 
modern understanding of them would suggest (cf. Green, 2004). Based on this distinction, I 
paid specific attention to visual inscriptions—mainly, but not exclusively, accounting 
inscriptions—and their agency in the reading of the archival material. This choice narrowed 
down the amount of material to be collected and analyzed, and it qualified the kind of literary 
genre (Czarniawska, 1997) to be observed. This also allowed me to put aside the 
contemporary understanding of these practices so that I could build up a fresh understanding 
of rationality, its sources, and its modes of operation. My purpose was to avoid imposing 
contemporary conventions and taken-for-granted categories, such as the economic nature of 
accounting, rationality, and bureaucratic order, on the historical evidence for the origins of 
category formation, such as the logics of market and religion. 
 
Data Sources 
Archival sources. The choice of the Sicilian Province as the main area of analysis 
directed my data collection to two main archives: the Archive of the State of Palermo (ASP), 
which housed the archival fund Ex Case Gesuitiche (Inventory No. 60), and the Archivum 
Romanum Societatis Iesu (the Roman Archive of the Society of Jesus, or ARSI), which is the 
main archive of the Order in its headquarters in Rome. The sources used are listed in the 
Online Appendix (http://asq.sagepub.com/supplemental). The material at ARSI constituted 
the main evidentiary basis for this paper, including in relation to the Roman Jesuits’ role in 
the administration of the Order (Lamalle, 1981–1982). I used the vast technical accounting 
material at ASP mainly for triangulating the practices described in Flori (1636), given his 
institutional role of Procurator of the Sicilian Province. 
ARSI was created as an instrument for the administration of the Order rather than 
simply as a site for collecting documents for historical purposes (see Lamalle, 1981–1982). I 
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consulted various ARSI sources, especially relating to the flow of correspondence between 
Rome and the Sicilian Province, to triangulate data with records kept at the ASP and with 
historical data on the history and development of the Order, its colleges, and its practices 
collected via secondary sources. A detailed description of these sources is provided in the 
Online Appendix in table 2A. These archival data were of primary importance for grounding 
my arguments on the non-representational function of Jesuit recordkeeping and linking it to 
practices of communication and representation in and between the center and the periphery of 
the Order. 
Documentary sources. To understand the structure and flow of communication 
between the center and the periphery of the Order, I referred to the Formula Scribendi (in 
Regulae Societatis Iesu, 1561; see also Boswell, 2003), which ruled the flow and format of 
the correspondence between the center of the Order in Rome and the peripheries of the Order. 
The key sources for understanding the principles that structured and governed the 
Order are the General Constitutions of the Society; I drew on the English translation by 
Ganss (1970). Because a clear-cut demarcation from administrative and other matters is 
difficult to make in the context of the Jesuit organization, I complemented the analysis of the 
Constitutions with two other key sources to understand their administration. The first is the 
Instructio pro administrationem rerum temporalium (Mangioni, 1649), which ruled the 
relationships among the Provincial (the officer heading the Province), the Rectors who had 
overall responsibility for the colleges, and the Procurators who were responsible for the 
colleges’ finances; it constituted instructions for what today would be called management 
control and internal audit. The second source is the accounting treatise Trattato del modo di 
tenere il libro doppio domestico col suo essemplare (Flori, 1636), recommended by the padre 
visitatore, one of the auditors to the Superior General of the Society (the leader of the Order), 
on his return from a periodic inspection in Sicily (ARSI, X) of the overall administration of 
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the Jesuit colleges. This treatise was officially reprinted in Rome in 1676, a sign of its 
usefulness. While the Constitutions and the Instructio, as much as the archival sources at 
ASP, are necessary for a general understanding of Jesuit rationality and practices of 
organization, the Trattato and the Formula Scribendi are key to building the relevant parallel 
between practices of spiritual self-accountability and those of administrative accounting and 
recordkeeping. This parallel is crucial in defining the Jesuits’ unfolding rationality. 
Building such a parallel required stepping back from modern conventions. First, the 
modern distinction that separates administrative from religious practices would have been an 
imposition on the archival evidence and would have obscured the very resonance of Jesuit 
practices. To make this resonance explicit, I consulted the Jesuit Spiritual Exercises, a text 
that deals with the search for individual morals and therefore is also key to understanding 
how the Jesuits built logics for informing rational behavior and organizational order. I used 
the English translation by Ganss (1991) and also an illustrated Italian edition published in 
Rome in 1666, which proved a useful comparison to understand the etymological origin and 
institutional dimension of some of the vocabulary in the text. 
 
Data Analysis 
My analysis builds on the broadly recognized conventions of grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Through an iterative approach, I made excerpts 
from the archival and documentary sources to create an understanding of the organizational 
practices within two distinct areas of Jesuit work: religious or spiritual practice and economic 
administration. I paid attention to the institutional vocabulary used in both the archival and 
documentary sources, which led to the identification of some common terms—e.g., punctus, 
a point; puntare, to punctuate; inventario, inventory—and common structures of Jesuits texts, 
such as between Flori’s Trattato and the Spiritual Exercises. This vocabulary helped me to 
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triangulate the data collected with historical studies on knowledge practices used in late-
medieval and early-modern times and with analyses of the influences on the intellectual 
formation of the Order’s founder and his followers. I identified common patterns and 
categories across the realms of spiritual practices and administrative order practices, which 
let me begin the presentation of the Jesuit way of administering the Order as a whole. I then 
iteratively and gradually constructed a theoretical framework to explain the unfolding nature 
of Jesuit procedural logics. This framework is composed of four rhetorical elements and 
informs both the illustration of the rhetorical literature I make in the following section and the 
analysis of Jesuit practices of spiritual self-accountability and administrative accounting and 
recordkeeping that I analytically illustrate in the empirical section. 
 
Framing Accounting and Rationality Historically and Theoretically: Links with 
Rhetoric 
Modern Readings of Rhetoric in Early Accounting 
Carruthers and Espeland (1991: 39) viewed accounting as an “attempt to convince 
someone of something” and gave various examples of this feature, ranging from accounting’s 
role in legitimating the medieval morality of profit to contemporary attempts to convince 
various audiences that the conduct of business is just (see also Aho, 2005). This emphasis on 
the rhetorical power of accounting is proper, especially in the context of studying rationality, 
for to “be rational is to make persuasive sense” (Green, 2004: 655). Within this frame (see 
also Zbaraki, 1998; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Hartelious and Browning, 2008), attention 
is given to certain “institutional vocabularies” that prompt change and to the emergence of 
new organizational forms (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; see also Covaleski et al., 1998) 
and their logic of action (Oakes, Townley, and Cooper, 1998). But beyond an exclusive focus 
on discourse, texts, and conveying given messages, studies in the field of medieval and early-
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modern literature (Yates, 1966; Carruthers, 1990, 1998; Bolzoni, 1995) have illustrated how 
rhetoric in practice made substantial use of material and mental imageries, as well as spaces, 
paper, ink, scent, perfume, and other artifacts, to help intellectuals and orators organize, 
memorize, and invent new knowledge (Bolzoni, 1995: xvi–xvii) and also to help religious 
members organize their liturgies and produce beliefs (Carruthers, 1998). The following 
overview of these practices will contextualize Jesuit spiritual, accounting, and recordkeeping 
practices. 
 
Medieval Rhetoric, Accounting, and Rationality 
Rhetoric as an analytical method of ordering knowledge. Carruthers (1998: 223) 
noted that “all medieval arts were conceived and perceived essentially as rhetoric, whether 
they took the form of poems or paintings or buildings or music.” Accounting was no 
exception. The etymology of the word “inventory” reveals the link; it comes from the Latin 
inventio, the first canon of rhetoric (see also Aho, 2005; Carruthers and Espeland, 1991). 
Inventio was concerned with, literally, “figuring out” the arguments to be dealt with in a 
speech in physical or mental spaces (loci) to ease their retrieval when needed in an oration. 
As noted by Carruthers (1998: 11), making such an inventory did not mean storing thoughts 
randomly but counting and placing them “in locations within an overall structure which allows 
any item to be retrieved easily and at once.” It is because of this historical link and not by 
chance (see Quattrone, 2009) that the Jesuit accountant Lodovico Flori (1636) organized his 
accounting treatise into three main parts that followed the three canons of classical rhetoric: 
how to prepare the books and the accounts, where to make the inventory (the equivalent of 
the preparation of the rhetorical loci for the inventio), how to dispose and order the ledger 
(rhetoric’s ordinatio et dispositio), and how to use the accounting books and the final balance 
sheet and income statements to account for the wealth of the college (equivalent to rhetoric’s 
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elocutio, i.e., the choice of the style used in the presentation of an argument to an 
auditorium). 
Early-modern times witnessed the encounter of rhetoric with analytical thinking based 
on dichotomies (see Ong, 1958, 1961), which populated university classrooms, as well as the 
emerging realms of scientific practices and the professions (see also Eisenstein, 1983, with 
reference to law). As noted by Bolzoni (1995: xix), great faith was “placed in the possibility 
of formulating a method that will rigorously regulate both knowledge and the ways of 
communicating and recalling it.” Rhetoric then became not only a means through which 
orators organized speeches to persuade an audience but also an analytical method of 
knowledge ordering: the first rhetorical element of the unfolding Jesuit rationality, which is 
described below in the empirical section. 
Rhetoric as composition of imageries. The Latin word inventio was the origin not 
only of the word “inventory” but also of “invention.” Thus medieval and early-modern 
rhetoric was “practiced as primarily a craft of composition rather than as one of persuading 
others” (Carruthers, 1998: 3). As noted by Bolzoni (1995: xvi–xvii), rhetoric, especially when 
used as a mnemonic technique by orators to remember speeches but also to invent arguments 
on the spot, used three essential components: it was topical (it classified knowledge in 
spaces), it was analytical (it organized this knowledge with a specific method), and it relied 
on images and visualizations (imagines agentes or acting images). These three components 
allowed the orator to establish an ordered set of associations that helped with recollecting 
memories. Acting images could take diverse forms, such as trees (hierarchical diagrams 
organized in dichotomies), logical maps (grids and matrixes), and wheels, but also 
manuscripts, books, and analytical spaces, such as churches and oratories. Acting images 
were not to be seen as representations of memories stored in our minds but as images whose 
composition in the present facilitated the establishment of new connections among the 
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elements inventoried through a web of techniques, practices, and artifacts (Carruthers, 1998: 
198–199). They resemble more recent theorizations of knowledge-producing devices as 
objects (see Knorr Cetina, 1997) that assume a stable identity and functionality, not because 
they produce neutral representations but because they produce effects (Thrift, 2007). With the 
language of contemporary sociology, one could say that these images were performative 
(MacKenzie, 2006; Cabantous and Gond, 2011) and also performable, as they offered the 
user the possibility of inventing new knowledge by doing things with them (Quattrone, 
2009). These images were not simple representations but contributed to what I define here as 
a composition of imageries, which constitute the second rhetorical element of unfolding 
Jesuit rationality. 
Rhetoric as motivating ritual. Acting images were also called rationes, which were 
“not reasons of the sort that engage a philosopher but ‘schemes’ or ‘ordering devices.’ . . . 
[in] Latin ratio [meant] ‘computation’ or ‘calculation’ not ‘reason’ in exactly our sense of the 
word” (Carruthers, 1998: 33). The Latin words ratio and calculus also meant “account” (see 
Goody, 1996: 12). Much as acting images were spatially based ordering and calculative 
schemes, an account is a space conventionally designed in the form of a T, thanks to which 
inventories can be made, accounting calculations performed, and rational and proper behavior 
conceived of and prompted. In other words, the system of knowledge classification and 
invention that medieval rhetoric designed “was architectural, such as palaces and churches” 
(O’Rourke Boyle, 1997: 8), for it required figurative, and at times also concrete, 
constructions. Figure 1 is an example of how this model also served meditation through a 
very specific meditation machine, a medieval church, which helped construct visions of truth. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
The plan shown in figure 1 reproduced the liturgical route that the faithful had to 
follow to compose a vision of God. Each space, such as the chapels, choirs, and altar, 
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constituted a punctus (point) that marked the process of meditation and where the faithful 
were asked to experience an image, either in the physical form of a painting or through the 
mental imagination prompted by praying.2 If all the steps and procedures of the liturgy were 
followed, the faithful were likely to experience an illumination, a vision of God, which in 
medieval Latin was called a theoria—a theory (from theós, “God,” and theorein, “to 
speculate,” in ancient Greek). 
But unlike in orthodoxy, in which divine truth is supposed to be firmly inscribed in 
texts, this meditative liturgy constituted an “orthopraxis” in which divine truth was supposed 
to be found by experiencing specific and detailed practices and rituals (see Bell, 1997: 191–
209; Carruthers, 1998: 254–276). Truth was therefore renewed and translated each time: the 
end of meditation (why it was carried out) was inextricably linked to the means through 
which meditation took place (how it was carried out). In the example of the chapel, rhetoric 
became an analytical craft to make “thoughts about God” (Carruthers, 1998: 2) and to create 
mystical visions of truth that made people believe in something they constructed through the 
ritual. This is why these rituals were recursively practiced and why I label them here as 
motivating rituals: they were not a mere sequence of routines but a ritual that engaged the 
participant by making her or him continuously search for but never find God. Motivating 
rituals are the third rhetorical element of unfolding Jesuit rationality. 
Rhetoric as a means of moral scrutiny. The rules of the craft of constructing 
knowledge and moral guidelines to inform social actions were not fixed as divine rules but 
were adapted to different situations, to the different intentiones (intentions) and skopos (a 
visual remnant that means a “mark on which to fix the eye” in ancient Greek) for which the 
                                                       
2 This process also relied on various other engagement mechanisms and artifacts, such as the echo of the 
church, the scent of incense, and touching the holy water and the relics of the saint. All these material artifacts 
provided a supporting structure within which the composition of visions of truth could take place (Carruthers, 
1998: 255). 
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meditation was performed. Intentio, as Carruthers noted (1990: 15), evokes the attitude, aims, 
and inclinations of a person who classifies knowledge for memory purposes. And given that 
memory, as much as epistemic objects (Knorr Cetina, 1997) and accounting, is about “what is 
no longer present” (Carruthers, 1990) and what is ambiguous and uncertain (Meyer, 1986), 
“‘representation’ . . . was understood not in an objective or reproductive sense” but as a tool 
to reflect on what counted as adequate knowledge (Carruthers, 1990: 222). This reflection 
required a purpose that was constantly classified, scrutinized, and reinvented. Without this 
intentio (the end), there is no inventio (the means) and thus no rationes, no inventory, no 
invention, and no divine truth: “craft rules, unlike Divine Law, are variable, and must be 
adapted to different situations” (Carruthers, 1998: 33). And again, as the etymology of the 
word reveals, these intentiones were always “in-tension,” thus serving as the precondition for 
new inventories. 
This model of rhetoric was an essential part of monastic meditation, in which what 
constituted good principles and moral beliefs to inform social and collective action was 
constantly questioned, re-thought, and re-defined in a liturgy that was the locus of the 
mediation between terrestrial and superior issues. Hence also the description of these 
practices as “epideictic” or “monastic” rhetoric, in which praising God and blaming evil was 
the ultimate end of this recursive meditation (O’Malley, 1979; Carruthers, 1998: 262). This is 
why I label this model as a means of moral scrutiny: the fourth rhetorical element of 
unfolding Jesuit rationality. 
Mastering this rhetorical craft of meditation marked the beginning of a shift. As 
Grafton and Jardine (1986) noted in relation to Ramism—which proposed analysis as an 
effective form of knowledge organization and learning (see Ong, 1958)—this shift initiated a 
process of identifying why actions are performed (the end, i.e., a moral issue) with how they 
are done (a matter of skill, i.e., the means). This new rationale for action made having and 
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mastering appropriate skills equivalent to virtue: the means became the end, and mastering 
these means equated with rational and appropriate behavior. 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 assembles the four elements of medieval rhetoric into the theoretical 
framework I used to develop the rhetorical analysis of the Jesuit practices of spiritual self-
accountability and of administrative accounting and recordkeeping in the empirical section of 
the paper. Meditative rhetoric made the construction of knowledge, especially of a divine 
nature, always dependent on how and why this construction took place, thus laying the 
foundations for the continuous unfolding of beliefs. 
 
Unfolding Jesuit Rationality: Procedural Logics of Order and Accountability 
Here I report on two parallel rhetorical analyses of Jesuit practices of spiritual self-
accountability and of administrative accounting and recordkeeping. I begin with a rhetorical 
analysis of the Jesuit Spiritual Exercises—prayers, meditations, and other exercises created 
by Saint Ignatius of Loyola in the sixteenth century—and their system of “accounting for 
sins” (Barthes, 1971). This analysis allows me to illustrate how the exercises drew on an 
analytical method to build a system of imagery construction that informed Jesuit rationality—
the framework that I outline in figure 2. I then move to accounting and other recordkeeping 
techniques, and I draw parallels between these two sets of practices. This comparison helps 
illustrate how practices in these separate realms present similar rhetorical features and how 
humanist techniques and principles aimed at spiritual meditation intertwined with emerging 
rational methods of accounting, which are today considered a quintessential source of 
economic rationality. Because of these links, I can illustrate how both practices of spiritual 
self-accountability and of administrative accounting and recordkeeping created and sustained 
a structure that supported a belief in the possibility of improving morals and of defining 
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legitimate social behaviors and order, without fully defining this order, given (and drawing 
upon) the incompleteness of the rhetorical representations used. This lays the groundwork for 
the discussion of unfolding Jesuit rationality. 
 
Accounting for Sins 
The Spiritual Exercises as an analytic method of knowledge ordering. The 
Spiritual Exercises, first published in 1548 (de Guibert, 1964: 113; see also Ganss, 1991), 
were meant to provide a method of examination of conscience and to “train” the Jesuits in 
preparing and disposing their souls to identify and remove the “disordered affections” that 
prevented “seeking God’s will” (Loyola, 1666: 1).3 The book contained a series of 
analytically detailed guidelines for the Director of the Exercises, who gave them, and for the 
exercitant, who received them. It prescribed, for instance, the place to perform the exercises, 
which was to be isolated and silent, and also the exercitant’s body position, e.g., kneeling, 
standing, sitting, or gazing upward depending on the kind of meditation to be performed. The 
exercises were organized analytically in a hierarchical tree with each exercise divided into 
prayers, preludes, points, and colloquy, and these were subdivided into other analytical 
categories (see Barthes, 1971: 57). 
The exercises were prescribed for a four-week period: two cycles of two weeks. The 
first week commenced with “a moral inventory of life” (O’Malley, 1994) through a particular 
and a general examination of conscience intended to prepare the soul for confession. In the 
examination of conscience, the exercitant was asked to interrogate himself on his daily sins 
twice a day: after the noon meal and after supper at night. For the noon examination, for 
example, he was asked to provide “an account of oneself with regard to the particular matter 
                                                       
3 In quoting passages from the Spiritual Exercises I follow conventions that indicate the paragraph and 
not the page of the book, identified here by the square brackets. 
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one has decided to take for correction and improvement. One should run through the time, 
hour by hour of period by period, from the moment of rising until the present examination” 
(Loyola, 1666: [25]). Nowhere in the exercises was the exercitant provided with a definition 
of God: he was simply given guidelines on how to praise God’s glory. The contents of the 
exercises were thus primarily methodological and illustrated procedural knowledge (the 
means, how) rather than substantial knowledge (the end, why). 
The Spiritual Exercises as composition of imageries. A specific visual inscription 
was prescribed for this examination of conscience, as shown in figure 3. For each sin 
committed from the moment of rising until the first examination, the exercitant was required 
to enter a dot (a punctus) on the upper line of the first series of lines. This step was followed 
by “one’s resolution to do better during the time until the second examination” (Loyola, 
1666, 25) after supper. At that time, other dots were placed on the lower line of the series 
for that day, and the exercitant was asked to see if his behavior had improved or worsened 
over the course of the day. The same process was repeated for virtuous behavior. This 
examination was to be repeated each day of the week from Sunday to Saturday, as indicated 
by the letter next to each set of lines. The space available for inscribing sins on the lines 
reduced in length each day, and the space available for inscribing virtuous behavior increased 
each day, signalling to the exercitant the need to improve his behavior and establishing what 
Barthes (1971: 70) described as a system of “accounting for sins.” 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
This moral inventory of the self was the beginning of an imaginary journey that was 
obsessively punctuated by visualizations that would eventually lead to a choice between God 
and Lucifer—the election—that could prompt action. In that first week of the exercises, the 
journey continued with the exercitant being urged to meditate about the seven deadly sins. He 
was asked first to compose the place where the action occurred, in this case where the sins 
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were committed, and remember how they brought him “to greater shame and confusion” 
(Loyola, 1666: [50]), to almost feel the pain inflicted by these sins to the body and soul. 
Figure 4 is a representation from the first illustrated edition of the Spiritual Exercises that 
makes this link explicit. 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
The same approach applied to a meditation on hell, during which the exercitant had to 
compose the space of hell by thinking of its “length, breadth, and depth” (Loyola, 1666: [65]) 
and then “see with the eyes of the imagination the huge fires and . . . the souls within the 
bodies full of fire” (Loyola, 1666: [66]). The exercitant, thanks to this imagery, would “hear 
the wailing, the shrieking, the cries, and the blasphemies against [the] Lord and all of his 
saints” (Loyola, 1666: [67]), by his “sense of smell [one] will perceive the sulphur, the filth, 
and the rotting things” (Loyola, 1666: [68]), by the “sense of taste . . . experience the bitter 
flavours of hell” (Loyola, 1666: [69]), and by the sense of touch “feel how the flames touch 
the souls and burn them” (Loyola, 1666: [70]). The construction of these disturbing feelings 
was sometimes accompanied by physical flagellation to reinforce the imagination and mark 
the experience. These visualizations were aimed to construct a full bodily and material 
experience. They were imagines agentes—images that generated effects—rather than simply 
representations of mental and moral statuses. 
The second week of exercises contrasted starkly with the first and constituted a further 
step in the exercitant’s journey. Here he was asked to perform a series of positive 
contemplations such as on “The life of [the] eternal King” (Loyola, 1666: [91–98]) or on the 
“Nativity” (Loyola, 1666: [110–117]). He was to imagine the “fragrance and taste, the 
infinite sweetness and charm of the Divinity, of the soul, of its virtues, and of everything 
there” (Loyola, 1666: [124]). After having constructed these positive images, the exercitant 
was ready to meditate on the “two standards, the one of Christ . . . the other of Lucifer” 
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(Loyola, 1666: [136]) and to finally make an election or choice. Once again, the exercitant 
was asked to imagine a scene for the meditation to take place. He was asked to visualize two 
opposite camps, one close to Jerusalem for Christ and the other close to Babylon for Lucifer, 
to imagine Lucifer seated on a “throne of fire and smoke, in aspect horrible and horrifying” 
(Loyola, 1666: [138]), and to imagine God residing in “an area which is lowly, beautiful and 
attractive” (Loyola, 1666: [155]). This prelude defines the conditions for an election: the 
exercitant finally chose God, and in this choice he found himself. 
The mirroring and imagery processes prompted by practicing the exercises were 
always incomplete, with human deficiency and fallability the preconditions for further 
examinations (see Knorr Cetina, 1997). As Meyer (1986) reminded us in relation to 
accounting, the accounting for sins during the Spiritual Exercises was useful to make sense of 
the invisible and opaque rather than to represent what was factually visible. What constituted 
the glory of God (ad maiorem Dei Gloriam, the Jesuit motto) was left undefined and for the 
exercitant to discover through rhetorical practices of praising it, that is, by performing the 
exercises and their visual inscriptions in a search for God that unfolded indefinitely.4 But how 
could incomplete visualizations, which always showed the fallacy of the self, sustain an 
accountability process without causing frustration and despair in the exercitant? 
The Spiritual Exercises as motivating ritual. The exercises supplemented the 
incomplete visual representations by asking the exercitant to perform a ritual that motivated 
him along a path that began with the self-recognition of being a sinner and ended with the 
possibility of the joy of salvation, as depicted in figure 5. The exercitant’s work of analytic 
composition in puncti (points) reproduced the rhetorical rhythm that engages users in 
methods of meditation (O’Rourke Boyle, 1997: 10). Thanks to this punctuation, which 
                                                       
4 The Spiritual Exercises belong to that rhetorical genre called “epideictic rhetoric,” i.e., a rhetoric aimed 
at praising something or someone.  
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marked a rhythmical progression (Barthes, 1971: 68) in which the exercitant was explicitly 
requested to pray “according to rhythmic measures” (Loyola, 1666 [258]), the Spiritual 
Exercises defined a sensible and convincing route for the journey the Jesuit member was 
asked to undertake. The exercises offered what Carruthers (1998: 266ff) defined as a 
liturgical ductus, i.e., a way, flow, movement, or orthopraxis—as in an aqueduct or as in the 
liturgy illustrated in figure 1—that began with the realization of being in perdition and 
eventually ended with the possibility of making the right choice, of finding salvation and 
realizing a vision of truth, i.e., a theoria. The exercises helped the exercitant to construct and 
reinforce a belief in the possibility of moral improvement and salvation. 
[Insert figure 5 about here] 
This path (the ductus) was the classical rhetorical structure of “medieval and 
renaissance masters of choice [in which] a character [in this case the exercitant’s self] was 
plotted as a traveller on the path of life, confronted at crossroads with moral decisions” 
(O’Rourke Boyle, 1997: 10), such as the election of the standard of God vs. that of Lucifer. 
Yet this journey was punctuated by invocations to look to the future; for instance, before 
going to bed the exercitant was asked to think about the meditations and exercises of the 
following day. Just as in Ignatius’s autobiography, the focus of the exercises was then not on 
the “conveyance of information, but on the persuasion of judgement” (O’Rourke Boyle, 
1997: 3). The text of the Spiritual Exercises is not aimed at representing the self but at 
engaging (O’Malley, 1993: 42) and training the self to become a means of judgment to praise 
God, whereby this God is inextricably linked to the self. 
The Spiritual Exercises as a means of moral scrutiny. As explained by Barthes 
(1971: 45), the Spiritual Exercises prompted “a language of interrogation” with which the 
exercitant examined his own nature in order to construct his self through the search for an 
absent God, who could be made present in the liturgy of the exercises’ orthopraxis. And yet 
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being on a road to salvation is not enough for a good and wise election. The exercises state 
that in a good election, 
I ought to find myself indifferent . . . to such an extent that I am not more inclined or 
emotionally disposed toward taking the matter proposed rather than letting go of it . . . 
. I should find myself in the middle, like the pointer of a balance, in order to be ready 
to follow that which I perceive to be more the glory and praise of God our Lord and 
the salvation of my soul. (Loyola, 1666: 179–180) 
 
The exercitant was asked to mediate in the double sense of being in the middle (from 
medium) and also being a medium to translate the glory of God into practical actions. He was 
asked to construct and inhabit a space between two opposites, such as God and Lucifer. This 
being in-different (i.e., in the middle of difference) could eventually lead to a choice, not 
imposed by an overarching logic found in the orthodoxy of sacred texts but created and 
reinvented purposefully through the ritual enactment of a series of methodological guidelines 
(the orthopraxis; Carruthers, 1998) and the use of material artifacts, such as the technology of 
accountability contained in the graphical “accounting for sins” depicted in figure 3. 
Definitions of God and of good behavior changed each time the ritual was enacted; the 
definition of ends and means unfolded. The Spiritual Exercises were a book “not to be read, 
but to be practiced” (de Guibert, 1964: 111). This indifference between the choice of two 
opposites, as discussed by Barthes (1971: 73), defines the “virtuality of the possible” that was 
channelled only when the construction of individual morality encountered the always-
changing pragmatic purposes that the Jesuits had to satisfy when pursuing missionary, 
pedagogical, and economic activities. 
With the understanding that praising God generates the idea of God, the significance 
of the exercises was “moral not empirical” (O’Rourke Boyle, 1997: 3): they prompted 
reflection, as in a mirror, but not representation, as in the modern sense of accuracy and 
isomorphism. The exercises produced images that constructed and not merely represented the 
morality of the self, and they prepared the self for being part of a collective enterprise. They 
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were concerned with the production of knowledge and religious truths, and they 
supplemented the incompleteness of representations with a meditative structure that 
reinforced a belief in improvement, which took place thanks to movement along a path (the 
ductus) constructed through rhetorical practices. Going through this ductus was the means 
through which the ends were constructed, made practical, and recursively questioned. 
The exercises thus comprised the four elements of medieval rhetoric identified earlier 
in the paper and shown in figure 2, and they led to a specific kind of knowledge: a mystical 
vision that was subject to continuous redefinition. These four elements were at work in early 
modern accounting, too, yet have now been made invisible, working behind the scrim of 
economic rationality thanks to the supposedly epistemic (rather than also moral) nature of 
accounting as a contemporary mode of social order. 
 
Jesuit Ordering 
Accounting and recordkeeping as analytic methods of knowledge ordering. 
Flori’s (1636) Trattato on accounting begins with the systematic preparation of what is 
needed for the organization of an accounting system, from the different categories of 
accounting books to the features of a single entry. This is Flori’s inventio (inventory), in 
which he asks the prospective accountant to identify analytical loci (spaces) where entries can 
be made in preparation for their subsequent dispositio (disposition). Flori begins at a very 
general level, with the classification of the different orders of accounting books needed in 
different kinds of business, and he goes down to the level of each individual entry (see 
Quattrone, 2009). These books comprised daily analytical notes used, and they served 
subsequently to order and dispose (i.e., format) the entries in the journal and ledger. This 
reference to the book of notes is typical of both the Jesuit pedagogy, which asked students to 
take notes of oral lectures to aid memory, and of rhetorical techniques more generally, which 
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reduce complex thoughts to short points to aid an orator’s memory (see Cevolini, 2006; 
Nelles, 2010). 
In preparing each entry, Flori suggested a standard format that identified clearly the 
debtor, creditor, amount, and reason, and then the time, quantity, currency, price, and the 
order in which the entry needs to be written, i.e., beginning with the debtor and ending with 
the price (Flori, 1636: 12–13). This classification followed a classical rhetorical technique of 
defining the items needed to construct a sound argument, such as who, what, why, and when 
(see Bolzoni, 1995). It was the basis of every grammatical analysis in the trivium, i.e., the 
three subjects of humanist pedagogy: grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Flori (1636: 23) labelled 
this classification process the “apparecchio del libro,” i.e., the preparation of the book for 
further elaboration, a term that recalls terminology used in the Spiritual Exercises (Loyola, 
1666: 1a) in relation to memory and meditation techniques: “memory displayed the matter 
prepared (apparacchiata) for the meditation.” 
This initial work enabled the second step in preparing the accounting system of the 
Jesuit colleges. Flori titled the second part of his Trattato “how one has to dispose and order 
the Ledger for achieving the intent which one wants, that is one of knowing in every moment 
the state of our things, and when it were needed, giving a good account of it” (Flori, 1636: 
43). The emphasis on this topical analysis makes the contents of the whole Trattato 
compatible with a schematic and visual representation in the format of a tree or hierarchy 
(Quattrone, 2004), which follows a decreasing level of synthesis from the general to the 
particular (Bolzoni, 1995). 
This triumph of analysis permeated the accounting books of the various colleges of the 
Sicilian Province. The college was the key administrative and economic unit of the Jesuit 
Order, and each had various sources of income: legacies and annuity payments for the 
foundation of the college, as well as donations received, farms, and rents from letting houses 
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and leasing land and small farms (see ASP, series A and L). Each college’s chart of accounts 
and income statements analytically accounted for these sources of income with continuity 
from the time the Order was founded (e.g., ASP, series AA, A, and L). 
Analysis also served to organize the plethora of other recordkeeping and 
accountability practices that spanned regular interactions between the center of the Order and 
its periphery (see ARSI, I–III, VIII–XI). For example, the Catalogi (Catalogues; see ARSI, 
IV–VII) were used to establish a link between the center in Rome and the dispersed 
peripheries of the Order, and their first two parts consisted of what today would be called a 
human resource report, providing biographical information, such as name, surname, age or 
date of birth, place of birth, and role within the Order (e.g., ARSI, IV and VI), and an 
assessment of each individual member of the Order on a four-point scale (from malus, bad to 
optimum, excellent) along seven dimensions: ingeniousness, intellect, prudence, experience, 
ability to profit from studies, character, and talents. The third part of the Catalogi contained 
information about the finances of the colleges and resembled the accounting information 
described earlier (see, for example, ARSI IV and VI). 
The second part of the Catalogi was called secretus (secret) because it did not contain 
the names of the members assessed, only a key to match this assessment with the names 
provided in the first part, which was sent separately to keep individual assessments 
confidential. The second part framed and analytically dissected Jesuits’ souls, mapping them 
to the Jesuit ideal that emphasized eloquence, wisdom, and judgment (see Boswell, 2003). 
The seven assessment dimensions were used to diagnose, give visibility to, and classify 
Jesuits in categories so that each member could be allocated to a mission that required that 
particular mix of abilities. These reports, together with another report called informationes 
(Friedrich, 2010), specified a detailed system of classification—not of financial entries in an 
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accounting book but of individual Jesuits, who were thus dispatched where most needed 
based on the objectives of changing organizational and social contexts. 
Accounting and recordkeeping as composition of imageries. For Flori the 
obsession with the analytical dissection of a college’s economic life was the precondition for 
composing an image of a Jesuit house in the final financial reports. If the analysis was 
performed well, the final synthesis would allow viewing “with a single and brief pen stroke, 
represented as in a most shining mirror, in the briefest sum, the whole status of the House or 
college” (Flori, 1636: 115).5 The use of the mirror metaphor is not a coincidence; it was part 
of that “renaissance rhetoric of the self” (O’Rourke Boyle, 1997: 3) that characterized 
Loyola’s autobiography, the accounting for sins as described in the Spiritual Exercises, and 
the account or recount of how the college had been administered. It is a further indication that 
accounting entries were made not simply for representational purposes but also for 
composing a vision of the college, of its mission, and of a relationship between the means 
(economic, in this case) and the ends—the overall morality of the Jesuit mission, which 
needed to be recomposed after being dissected. For Flori, analysis was not aimed at a simple 
dissection but at a reflection on the Jesuit body as a whole. This act of composition was also a 
way to reflect on how past, present, and future activities of the college were tightly linked. 
Flori’s emphasis on analysis led him to make notable contributions to the practice of 
accounting that remain today. He was, for example, the first to introduce the technique of 
accruals (Melis, 1947), which he explained this way: 
This diligence, that is used in dividing and separating so minutely the accounts, the 
rubrics of the Farms, the Lands and the other fixed assets, assigning its expense to 
each revenue, is to be followed, as much as possible, in distinguishing all the other 
accounts. . . . And all of this is done for each year has its expense and its revenue, nor 
that of one year is confused with the revenue and expense of the other, with little 
                                                       
5 Here is another indication of the relationship between accounting and rhetorical techniques to aid 
orators, as brevitas (brevity) and tractus (stroke, sign) are two key ingredients of a good memory that needs to 
fixate memories in the mind through brief signs. 
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honour of who administers, and the greatest loss of the Houses, and the Colleges. 
(Flori, 1636: 60–61) 
 
This accounting innovation, though, was not—or at least not only—the result of a supposedly 
pressing need for rational administration. Flori’s way of thinking, his forma mentis, led him 
to inventory, order, and dispose not only spaces but also time, which is therefore spatialized 
linearly and can be segmented into fully autonomous financial years. The invention of the 
accruals created another opportunity for the accountant to pause and “speculate” (from 
speculum, i.e., mirror in Latin) or reflect on how to distribute income accurately between 
present and future. Again, accounting systems and rules did not define the rational amount of 
that income but forced the accountant to “figure out” that amount, creating an opportunity to 
find a balance between the need to sustain the college economically and the overall morality 
of Jesuit actions. 
This imaginative rather than representational function of Jesuit accounting also 
characterizes the extensive documentation flows between Rome and the Order’s various 
missions (see Nelles, 2010). For instance, Juan Alfonso de Polanco, secretary to the first three 
leaders of the Order (O’Neill and Domínguez, 2001: 3168), provided guidelines on how 
missionaries should take notes in preparation for periodic reports to be sent to Rome. He 
asked them to reflect on the mission as a whole “as though from a very high place” so to 
observe how “the entire enterprise unfolds, how ground is being gained or lost . . . which 
things should be adopted, continued, abandoned, or changed” (Nelles, 2010: 327). In doing 
so, Polanco asked the missionaries to compose a balanced image of the mission, similar to 
what the exercitant of the Spiritual Exercises was asked when performing a mnemonic 
composition of the places in the various meditations he had to make. In the Jesuit missionary 
activity, taking notes “was to serve as an aid to, and not simply a record of, observation. 
Writing notes enabled the Jesuits to recall, visualize, and focus upon particular aspects of the 
experience of the mission” (Nelles, 2010: 319). Recordkeeping, writing, and visualizing were 
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therefore ingrained in the very essence of being a Jesuit, as members of the Order were 
exposed both to pedagogical practices that relied on note taking and to the contemplative 
practice of the Spiritual Exercises that “placed a premium upon the visualization of the object 
of knowledge” (Nelles, 2010: 320) to be gained. 
Accounting and recordkeeping as motivating ritual. The various activities 
described so far are all repetitive: accounts have to be prepared regularly and correspondence 
has to be sent to Rome following the rhythm defined by the Formula Scribendi. Flori also 
designed a ritual of checks for verifying the accuracy of entries made in a college’s 
accounting books. He urged college accountants to perform a verification called the “modo e 
del tempo di puntare il libro” (Flori, 1636: 97)—the “way [or method] and the time when to 
punctuate the book”—and gave specific rules and procedures, including how to place the 
book on the desk and which hand to use in following the entries. The accountant was asked to 
mark firmly in his mind, and on the accounting book, the entries made and to check their 
validity by mirroring each entry in the journal with the correspondent in the ledger. This 
process was to be done with a “good practical companion, who can help us read and 
punctuate in the above mentioned way the Journal” (Flori, 1636: 98). This verification ritual 
was strictly followed in the colleges, as testified by the puncti (brief ticks) found in Jesuit 
college accounting books (e.g., ASP, I–VII), and it connects with Jesuit pedagogy in which 
the master was supposed to read aloud and the students to take brief notes to fix knowledge in 
their minds (Nelles, 2010). This ritual was also equivalent to what the Spiritual Exercises 
prescribed when the director was to read instructions to the exercitant, who was to mark 
passages in the construction of meditative images.6 If the verification was successful, then the 
accountant was put on a journey toward giving the final account to the padre visitatore, a 
                                                       
6 This practice is also the remnant of an aural culture, which gave predominance to hearing rather than 
seeing when constructing images of truth (see Clanchy, 1979). The term “auditing” comes from audire, i.e., 
“hearing” in Latin. 
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representative of the leader of the Order. On this journey, accounting represents a map, 
method, way, or ductus that begins with making an inventory, be it of the self or of assets and 
liabilities, and ends with salvation, which metaphorically Flori identified with reaching a safe 
harbor: 
Because there are so many obstacles that one goes through and encounters in the ocean 
of this [ongoing] concern, that without this chart we would often be in a great danger of 
getting lost, without knowing where we are. But, if we will have conceived of, well 
ordered and disposed well in our mind these accounts, which are like many instruments 
to steer this boat, there will not be any difficulty, which cannot be overcome with 
easiness and delight, to finally land in the desired port. (Flori, 1636: 46) 
 
The same rhythm underlying the performance of the accounting procedures 
characterized the other recordkeeping practices as well. For instance, the Formula Scribendi 
strictly prescribed the frequency of the correspondence between the Order’s periphery and its 
various levels of organizational hierarchy: letters had to be exchanged among Rectors, 
Provincials, and missions weekly, monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, annually, every three years, 
or “when required” depending on the hierarchical vicinity of those exchanging the 
correspondence (see Quattrone, 2004).7 The Catalogi (Catalogues) were the cornerstone of 
this system, allowing the Rector and the Provincial to compose in writing an image of their 
mission and their colleges and giving them an opportunity to interrogate themselves and their 
companions on the morality of their conduct and the possibility of its improvement in the 
moment in which they had to provide an account to their direct superiors. Much as in the 
modern corporation, the Jesuits made communication a managerial tool (Chandler, 1977; 
Yates, 1989) that spanned across what today we would call organizational functions, thus 
ensuring organizational order across dispersed geographical spaces. This accomplishment 
                                                       
7 The Order was possibly the first religious institution that made use of the increased reliability of the 
postal service as an instrument of administrative coordination (Friederich, 2007). Utilizing a network of local 
and global archives, the core of which was constituted by the ARSI in Rome, they purposively created an 
instrument of government and not just a simple repository of documentation (Lamalle, 1981–1982). 
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occurred not through a search for efficiency but rather by the translation of dynamic 
rhetorical practices into the basis of administration. 
Accounting and recordkeeping as means of moral scrutiny. In the preface of his 
treatise, Flori stated that accounting was a scientia prattica, a pragmatic science (Flori, 1636, 
in the author’s notes to the reader; see also Long, 2001: 2), the aim of which was not to 
establish truths but to solve problems that were always changing because the intentions that 
drove accounting calculations were always different. To make accounting practical meant 
providing a method flexible enough to be adapted to all types of circumstances, thanks to the 
infinite combinatory possibilities given by the segmentation and recomposition of accounts. 
For Flori, being a good accountant (a good maestro rationale, as an accountant was addressed 
in early-modern Italy) implied mastering a method that consisted of 
preparing those accounts and rubrics, to better achieve our intention, and in the way of 
closing them. For if that who governs the book will not have first well-conceived in his 
mind, and made his own these accounts and rubrics . . . he will not be able to guide this 
boat to the harbour. (Flori, 1636: 46) 
 
Thanks to this ordering process, the accountant could produce a meaningful disposition, 
recombining the elementary spaces represented by each individual T account in ways that 
created a vision “in his mind” that would help achieve the multifaceted purposes of the Jesuit 
missions and enterprises. 
But accountants’ intentions were not fixed in stone. Here the link between accounting 
and rhetoric is important for, as Carruthers noted (1998: 15), rhetoric’s intentio is an 
attitude—that person’s aims and inclinations—as well as a reflection on the moral condition 
of the “civic being,” which is to be explored using rhetorical techniques. Accounting shares 
with rhetoric this method of analysis and, as much as medieval and early-modern rhetoric, is 
not aimed at representation but at generating a vision and a wise choice. 
Following these rhetorical principles, the Jesuits designed a series of recordkeeping 
mechanisms, coupled with a coherent system of governance, to promote the exercise of wise 
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management. In specific accounting practices, for instance, the padlock for the college cash 
box required two keys (Flori, 1636: 72), one to be kept by the Procurator, who was in charge 
of economic affairs, and one by the Rector, who had overall responsibility for the college and 
its missionary, pedagogical, and economic activities. This provision ensured that every cash 
movement, and its record in the accounting books, could happen only after a continuous 
mediation and discussion of the potential uses of the funds for which the Procurator and the 
Rector acted as spokespersons, e.g., pragmatic needs related to running the college, political 
matters related to the Jesuit influence on the local community, and pedagogical and religious 
concerns. The existence of a material padlock operated by two keys allowed a continuous 
performance around the notion of rational and legitimated behavior when cashing and 
spending money.8 This continuous mediation around and questioning of the rationale 
informing the opening of the box made the Jesuit rationality an unfolding one. 
As with every graphical representation, the translation of cash movements into 
accounting inscriptions would have reduced the multifaceted nature of the Jesuit 
administration to a mere financial matter, leading to an incontrovertible financial theoria and 
to unreflective actions. This unreflective representation would have deprived the Jesuit 
member of that indifference that characterized the Jesuit’s self and made him able to exert 
wise judgment. Jesuits’ representations, whether dealing with spiritual or financial matters, 
were meant to manage and not reduce the “virtuality of the possible” of Jesuit behaviors 
(Barthes, 1971). They were not aimed at producing matters of fact but matters of concern.9 
This is why the Jesuits’ governance created spaces and material practices for this mediation, 
                                                       
8 If the Rector had to authorize the Procurator to spend money, one key (kept by the Rector) would have 
sufficed. If the two keys had served the purpose of preventing theft, while breaking a padlock with one or two 
keys would not have made the operation more complex, forcing two keyholes or breaking two padlocks could. It 
is only by inserting this material solution into the various mediating mechanisms of the Jesuit administration 
that a mediating function of the cash box can be theorized. (Another accounting mediating solution, for instance, 
relates to the functioning of the accounting system of the Province; see Quattrone, 2004, for details.) I am 
grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for comments on this matter. 
9 I use here Latour’s (2005) language. 
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discussion, and imagination to happen continuously. The Jesuits knew that simplicity allows 
action but is not a condition for exerting wise judgment. 
 
Discussion 
Building on studies of late-medieval and early-modern rhetoric, I theorized unfolding 
rationality through the interplay of four rhetorical elements: the analytic method of 
knowledge ordering, the composition of imageries, motivating ritual, and means of moral 
scrutiny. These elements explain how the composition of rhetorical imageries created a space 
in which order and knowledge could be classified and reinvented through a constant process 
of interrogation of organizational imperatives and means to realize them. This procedural 
logic generated and sustained the engagement of Jesuit members in a series of routine 
activities that allowed the Order to achieve what contemporary organizations still struggle to 
attain: to endure across time and extend across space while flexibly innovating and adapting 
to changing contexts and circumstances. 
The evidence presented in this paper illustrates how Jesuit practices of spiritual self-
accountability and of administrative accounting and recordkeeping were powerful, 
intertwined procedures for generating order and wisdom rather than merely producing facts to 
represent the self, the economy, and the state of the Order. These practices were not aimed at 
providing answers through substantive representations but at continuously generating 
questions about God, about the self, and about the right course of action to be taken in 
various circumstances. 
Thanks to the translation of rhetorical practices into the field of business 
administration, the Jesuits’ rationality inextricably linked how social action took place (the 
means) to debating why this action took place (the ends, their intentio). The Order therefore 
operated as a gigantic rhetorical machine, which made the continuous reinvention of its 
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reason of existence one of its main features. This allowed the Jesuits to understand and stay 
in tune with the context in which they operated, guaranteeing their endurance across time and 
coordination across space. Jesuits’ practices and routines supported the construction of a 
belief in moral improvement that ensured the repetition of the process and also continuously 
regenerated the rationale underpinning the Jesuit order: the Jesuit Order was thus, and 
operated as, a continuous Jesuit ordering. This is why I label their rationality as unfolding. 
The historical genealogy for accounting rationality that I demonstrate in this paper is a 
direct response to Weber’s (1956: 183) call for investigating further the genesis of modern 
rationality by looking into “humanistic rationalism, its ideal of life and cultural influence.” 
This research offers insights to revisit the relationships between Protestant ethics and Western 
notions of modern rationality that are now taken for granted. Though this paper is not making 
claims on the diffusion of Jesuit accounting practices outside the Order, other historical 
works have illustrated how accounting developments in Italy (see Melis, 1947), among which 
those written by members of the Catholic Orders shine,10 influenced Dutch (ten Have, 
1956),11 German (Yamey, 1982), and English accounting into the modern period (see Besta, 
1922: 321ff; Woolf, 1986: 131–143; Catturi, 1988).12 These are the very same techniques that 
traveled across Europe and intertwined elsewhere with the same movements that I describe in 
this paper, e.g., Ramism (see Ong, 1958; Grafton and Jardine, 1986: 168). 
The point I make in this paper is methodological and then theoretical, not only 
historical. The different historical genealogy proposed allowed me to theorize differently not 
                                                       
10 These members include Pacioli, a Franciscan, author of the famous Summa; Pietra (1586), a 
Benedictine, with his Ramist analytical charts; and Flori (1636), a Jesuit, credited with the invention of accruals 
(Melis, 1947). 
11 ten Have (1956) illustrated the influence of the Italian method of bookkeeping on Simon Stevin’s 
treatise published in Dutch in 1610. 
12 A linear theory of diffusion would not be able to capture the complexities of the influences in the 
development of accounting. For example, the Flemish mathematician Stevin (1607), when dealing with double-
entry bookkeeping, quoted the Italian Benedictine Pietra (1586) and was then quoted (along with Pietra) by Flori 
(1636). The circulation of accounting ideas was as complex as the circulation of goods. 
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only accounting (see Quattrone, 2009) but also rationality and logics of order (see Hallett and 
Ventresca, 2006). Before becoming “rationality,” ratio did not mean “reason” but 
“calculation” and “account” (Goody, 1996: 12, 49ff), and it was an expression of a figurative 
ability to pragmatically recombine accounting loci (spaces) in rationes (schemes or ordering 
devices; see Carruthers, 1998: 39) to solve problems that one may encounter. A good 
accountant (a maestro razionale as in early-modern Italian) had to be able to make 
associations among text, images, accounts, and what they stood for in ways that would prove 
useful and generate wisdom. In fact, the Libro della ragione did not mean “‘Book of Logic’ 
but instead ‘Ledger’” (Murray, 1978: 205), and Ragioneria, in contemporary Italian, means 
“accounting” (see Goody, 1996: 12), showing a remnant of that medieval link between ratio 
and account that is now typically unnoticed. The rationale for these procedures is now 
obscured (Powell and Colyvas, 2008: 280) and has become a taken-for-granted motivating 
ritual (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; see also Miller and Power, 2013). 
My direct use of the humanist tradition provides methodological starting points to 
develop this alternate account of rationality that builds on the relationships among incomplete 
representations, ambiguity, and the procedural nature of institutional logics of order (see 
March, 1987). Thanks to this alternate genealogy, I can show how the humanist influence on 
modes of administrative ordering, and their emphasis on visual representations as imagines 
agentes (acting images) and not as objective reproductions, made such logics procedural and 
not substantive. The lack of objectivity of these reproductions, and their inherent 
incompleteness, generated a rationality that was unfolding because it was not meant to be 
objectified in factual representations. This created the conditions for dynamic ordering and 
organizing logics. These findings offer insights on how to reassess the notion of institutional 
logic (Friedland and Alford, 1991) and how it has been recently mobilized in organizational 
theory (see Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012). 
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Outlining a Research Agenda: Procedural Logics, Order, and Dynamism 
The case of the Society of Jesus provides historical material to speculate 
systematically on how the logic informing Jesuit behavior is inconsistent with a substantive 
notion of logic, i.e., a logic with specific and fixed beliefs and assumptions. This challenges 
key assumptions in much work with one or more dominant logics that are internally stable 
and shape practice, such as religion, the state, and the market. The “Jesuit way” of governing 
the Order was constituted by a mixture of practices that today would be classified as 
religious, literary, economic, and scientific and that then represented an amalgam of 
knowledge-definition principles that we now call humanism. In this sense, not even religion 
could be seen as constituting a substantive logic informing Jesuits’ actions, as what 
constituted God depended on an individual process of meditation, scrutiny, discovery, and 
reinvention. The Jesuit way was founded in a constellation of ways of knowing rather than in 
a single or even hybrid logic informing organizational and individual behaviors. 
These findings have implications for researchers’ conceptions of logic and respond to 
calls for a greater understanding of how individuals and organizations cope with institutional 
complexity (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011) through institutional practices 
(e.g., Anteby, 2010; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010) that are situated and flexible. This focus 
on practices also extends the sources of dynamism in institutional logics (Hallett and 
Ventresca, 2006), institutions (Clemens, 2013), and legitimated accounts that come as “ready 
to wear” clothes available to individuals (Creed, Scully, and Austin, 2002). Clothes may well 
make the person, but they can be made in different textures, and people wear them for 
different purposes and with different bearings. 
First, the Jesuits’ commitment to the endogenous dynamism of logics promotes an 
alternative to a too-instrumental and substantialist view of rationality and social order, which 
  
 39 
in turn resulted in a conception of order, logics, and institutions based on a given set of 
beliefs and assumptions. Conceiving of logics as substantive implies that dynamism can 
emerge only as the result of some kind of competition among or recombination of such given 
logics (e.g., Reay and Hinings, 2009; McPherson and Sauder, 2013). 
The procedural nature of Jesuits’ logics of order illustrates that how things are done is 
inextricably linked to why they are done. Reasoning in terms of the co-production of means 
and ends is as important as reasoning in terms of what institutional logics are about, including 
logics of the market, democracy, the family, the state, and religion. The how and why (as well 
as when and where these logics are enacted) define the dimensions of late-medieval and 
early-modern practices of classification and invention, and they can now be coherently 
organized in a theoretical framework that also offers methodological coordinates to speculate 
on how individual, organizational, and social actions and their cross-level relationships 
unfold, thanks to the enactment of material imageries and practices (Meyer et al., 2013). 
These practices constitute and have effects across different levels at once and revitalize a 
notion of organizational fields as heuristic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) rather than as 
factual and categorical arrangements of institutional elements. 
Second, the procedural nature of the notion of unfolding rationality calls for further 
research on whether this nature applies also to other notions of logics and, if it does, under 
which conditions and with what theoretical implications. For instance, recent work on 
corporate morality in the context of business education (Anteby, 2013) shows how such 
education operationalizes a moral pursuit rather than a moral order (see also Davis-Blake, 
2015). This distinction is analogous to that made in this paper between the substantive vs. 
procedural nature of institutional logic. For Weber, action is social, that is, oriented with 
regard to others. Both distinctions pose the question of what happens to these procedures of 
order-seeking when operating without an orienting system (Weber, 1978), be this the 
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Protestant ethic (Weber, 1956), Catholic faith, or the ethos of American corporate capitalism 
(Anteby, 2013). 
The cases of business education at Harvard and of the Jesuit Order both highlight that 
a possible way forward is offered not by pursuing a positivist description of beliefs and 
assumptions but by inquiring into what is not said (i.e., silence in the case of Harvard 
Business School) and what is not represented (the incompleteness of Jesuit representations 
for moral “in-difference” and scrutiny). In other words, to rearticulate analytical building 
blocks of logics, such as sources of legitimacy, authority, and control (Thornton, Ocasio, and 
Lounsbury, 2012: 54ff), research should be methodologically inspired by a search for what 
cannot be categorically framed—what could be termed here as a procedural approach. 
Finally, the study of unfolding rationalities promotes renewed attention to endogenous 
dynamism in order to theorize the contradictions that characterize organizations’ emergence, 
development, endurance across time, and extension across space. Notions of logics have 
become inattentive to the places and times in which order is formed and logics operate, thus 
granting social actors either too much or too little agency in defining patterns of legitimated 
social behavior. The incumbent approach moves us further away from Friedland and Alford’s 
(1991) critique of functional and determinist understanding of social order and legitimated 
behavior. It also contradicts studies that foreground how the emergence and resilience of 
institutional logics are characterized by mutability, contradictions, multiplicity, and 
innovation (e.g., Padgett and Ansell, 1993; Clemens and Cook, 1999; Padgett and Powell, 
2012). 
Unfolding rationalities represent a methodological commitment to understand how 
individuals are always above and below the script that shapes patterns of actions, 
organizations, and rational administration. It is in between these levels that social order, as a 
contested category, is religiously sought but never fully accomplished. 
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